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Abstract
Popper’s original definition of truthlikeness relied on a central in-
sight: that truthlikeness combines truth and information, in the sense
that a proposition is closer to the truth the more true consequences
and the less false consequences it entails. As intuitively compelling
as this definition may be, it is untenable, as proved long ago; still,
one can arguably rely on Popper’s intuition to provide an adequate
account of truthlikeness. To this aim, we mobilize some classical work
on partial entailment in defining a new measure of truthlikeness which
satisfies a number of desiderata. The resulting account has some inter-
esting and surprising connections with other accounts on the market,
thus shedding new light on current attempts of systematizing different
approaches to verisimilitude.
Keywords: truthlikeness, verisimilitude, information, content, con-
sequence, similarity, Schurz and Weingartner, Oddie.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Defining truthlikeness: three approaches 3
3 Truthlikeness as (partial) information about the truth 6
3.1 The basic feature approach to truthlikeness . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 From “categorical” to “partial” information . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 Discussion and comparison with other accounts 12
4.1 A surprising equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Truthlikeness and logical strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
∗Final preprint draft. Published as: G. Cevolani and R. Festa (2018). “A partial
consequence account of truthlikeness”. In: Synthese. url: 10.1007/s11229-018-01947-
3.
†IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Piazza San Francesco 19, 55100 Lucca
(Italy). E-mail: gustavo.cevolani@imtlucca.it
‡Department of Humanistic Studies University of Trieste, Via Principe di Montfort 3,
34124 Trieste (Italy). E-mail: festa@units.it
1
5 Conclusions and further work 17
A Proofs 21
1 Introduction
Intuitively, a proposition (or theory, or hypothesis) h is “close to the truth”
when it tells many things about the relevant domain, and many of these
things are true, or at least approximately true. In this sense, truthlikeness
or verisimilitude is “a mixture of truth and information”, as Oddie (1986,
p. 12) puts it: the more true information h provides about the domain, the
closer to “the whole truth” h is (cf. Popper 1963, p. 237).
Starting in the seventies of the past century, logicians and philosophers
of science proposed a number of competing formal explications of the above
intuition (for surveys, see Niiniluoto 1998 and Oddie 2016). As a result of
this ongoing work, quite different accounts of truthlikeness are currently on
offer. More recent research has increasingly focused on the attempt of clas-
sifying and comparing such accounts in an abstract, general way (see, e.g.,
Zwart 2001, Niiniluoto 2003, Zwart and Franssen 2007, Schurz and Wein-
gartner 2010, and Oddie 2013). This led to both refining and revising the
informal distinction between “content” and “likeness” approaches that was
routinely employed to classify different accounts of truthlikeness (cf., e.g.,
Oddie 1986, p. x). In particular, Gerhard Schurz has convincingly argued
for the importance of recognizing a third, “consequence” approach to defin-
ing verisimilitude, based on a “conjunctive” representation of propositions
as sets of (relevant) consequences, in contrast with a “disjunctive” view in
terms of possible worlds or state descriptions (Schurz and Weingartner 2010;
Oddie 2013).
In this paper, we introduce and discuss a novel truthlikeness measure
with the following features: it fits nicely within a conjunctive and consequence-
based approach to verisimilitude as the one advocated by Schurz; it satisfies
most adequacy conditions discussed in the literature; and finally, as it turns
out somehow surprisingly, it is equivalent to a well known measure proposed
within one standard disjunctive and likeness-based approach to truthlikeness
(the so called Tichy´-Oddie’s average measure). Our results thus shed new
light on current work on analyzing and systematizing different and compet-
ing approaches to verisimilitude.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the fundamental ideas concern-
ing truthlikeness and the classification of different approaches. In section 3
we introduce a novel truthlikeness measure and discuss its main properties.
The main result of the paper comes in section 4, where the equivalence be-
tween our measure and Tichy´-Oddie’s “average” measure is proved. In this
section, we also discuss the relationship between our account and other ap-
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proaches, including Schurz and Weingartner’s “relevant element” definition
of truthlikeness and Niiniluoto’s similarity-based account. Finally, section 5
contains some concluding remarks and directions for future work. The proofs
of all main claims in the paper appear in the final appendix.
2 Defining truthlikeness: three approaches
Two friends, Henry and Gloria, are planning a trip and wonder about the
weather they are going to find at their destination. Henry believes that it will
be hot, rainy, and windy (call h this conjunction); Gloria is more optimistic,
and believes g, that it will be hot, dry, and windy. In short, they agree they
shall have a hot and windy day, but disagree about whether it will rain or
not. Now suppose that, as a matter of fact, on their arrival the weather
is actually cold, rainy and windy: this represents “the whole truth”, call it
t, about the weather conditions in the relevant place and time. It is now
clear that Gloria made a mistake in predicting no rain, and that Henry was
right. On the other hand, they were both wrong in believing that it would
be hot. Still, it seems clear that Henry was closer to the truth than Gloria
was: he made only one mistake (“hot” instead of “cold”), while she erred
on two counts (“hot” and “dry”). In other words, it seems natural to say
that while both h and g are false propositions, h is a better approximation
to the truth t than g is.
The first goal of a theory of truthlikeness is to make sense of assessments
of relative closeness to the truth like the one considered above. All current
accounts of verisimilitude deliver such assessments for at least some of the
propositions of the relevant languages. Still, they disagree quite wildly on
how truthlikeness should be defined and evaluated. To illustrate, consider
the following small sample of basic principles, proposed by different partic-
ipants to the debate as adequacy conditions for a definition of truthlikeness
(for discussion, see especially Niiniluoto 1987, 232 ff. and Oddie 2013): given
two distinct propositions h and g,
P1 If h and g are false, h may be closer to the truth than g;
P2 If h is false and g is true, h may be closer to the truth than g;
P3 If h and g are true, and h entails g, h is closer to the truth than g;
P4 If h and g are false, and g entails h, h may be closer to the truth than
g.
P1 requires that false propositions can differ in truthlikeness, as in the simple
example given before. P2 says that sometimes a falsehood may be better
(i.e., more verisimilar) than a truth: for instance, if the weather is actu-
ally cold, rainy and windy, saying (falsely) that it is hot, rainy and windy
3
may be better than simply saying it is either cold or rainy, which is true
but not very informative. Indeed, truthlikeness is a “game of excluding
falsity and preserving truth”, as Niiniluoto (1999, p. 73) puts it, and de-
pends on the relative amount of true and false information provided about
the world. Condition P3 requires that truthlikeness increases with logical
strength among true propositions, while P4 denies this must be the case for
false propositions.
Interestingly, with the only exception of P1 all other requirements are
violated by at least one of the approaches to truthlikeness currently on the
market (see Cevolani 2017 for discussion). In early work on truthlikeness,
it has been customary to classify such approaches as either “content-based”
or “likeness-based” (see, e.g., Oddie 1986, p. x). Roughly, according to
the former the truthlikeness of h only depends on the informative content
and the truth-value of h; according to the latter, truthlikeness is a matter of
how similar a proposition actually is to the complete description of the truth
about the relevant domain. A couple of examples will serve to illustrate the
essential intuitions behind each of them.
Within a content approach, the relative verisimilitude of two propositions
h and g can be easily assessed at least in two “easy” cases (in most of the
other cases, propositions can well be incomparable in truthlikeness). First,
suppose that h and g are equally informative, but h is true and g false:
then h is more verisimilar than g. For instance, in our weather example,
“rainy” is as informative as its negation “dry”, but the former is true and
hence more verisimilar than the latter, which is false. Second, suppose that
h and g have the same truth value, but h is more informative than g: then,
h is also more truthlike than g. For instance, both “cold and rainy” and
“cold” are true propositions, but the former is more verisimilar than the
latter. This immediately implies that content accounts will meet condition
P3: if h and g are both true, and h entails g (and, in this sense, h is more
informative), h is more verisimilar than g. By the same reasoning, however,
if h and g are both false, and h entails g, h is again more verisimilar than
g, thus violating condition P4. This latter result is known in the literature
as the child’s play objection (cf. Tichy´ 1974, 157, fn. 2): if P4 fails, the
truthlikeness of a false proposition can be increased just by strengthening it
with some trivial falsehood.
Turning now to likeness approaches, they start by defining a distance
measure (or at least a comparative notion of relative closeness) among the
possible states of affairs characterizing the relevant domain (i.e., the possible
worlds or their linguistic descriptions, see below). Then, the truthlikeness of
h is a function of the distances between the actual state of affairs and those
possible worlds which are compatible with h. If this function is sufficiently
sophisticated, the resulting explication will vindicate intuitive assessments
of truthlikeness and eschew the child’s play objection, by satisfying condition
P4 (we shall see an example in section 4). Still, it is possible that P3 is now
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violated: for instance, according to Oddie (2013)’s characterization, likeness-
based accounts meet P4 but violate P3 (however, other likeness approaches,
like the one proposed by Niiniluoto 1987, meet both P3 and P4).
This informal characterization of content and likeness approaches is al-
ready sufficient to emphasize important differences between them. One, as
Zwart (2001) first noted, concerns the following question: given that the
truth t itself is of course the most verisimilar proposition, which one has the
least degree of truthlikeness? The two approaches give different answers.
Since ¬t, the negation of the truth, is the weakest, and hence least informa-
tive, false proposition, it is also the least truthlike for content approaches.
Within a likeness approach, instead, this role is reserved to the “complete
falsehood” f , i.e., to the proposition which is the farthest from the truth
t—like “hot, dry, and still” in our initial example.
The attempt to use the distinction above to classify different accounts
within the content and likeness camps (Zwart 2001; Zwart and Franssen
2007) has been criticized by both Schurz and Weingartner (2010) and Oddie
(2013). In particular, Schurz, followed on this by Oddie, has convincingly
argued for the need of recognizing a third kind of approach to defining
truthlikeness, different from both content and likeness approaches. Within
this “consequence” approach, the truthlikeness of h depends on the bal-
ance of the true and false propositions entailed by h or, in other words, on
the relative amount of true and false information conveyed by h about the
world. It follows that a consequence approach will agree with a content-
based one in accepting P3, i.e., the idea that, among truths, verisimilitude
increases with informativeness, since a more informative proposition will
have in this case more true consequences. On the other hand, it will agree
on P4 with likeness-based accounts, since having more false consequences
can well translate into lower overall truthlikeness. In sum, according to
Schurz, consequence-based accounts combine the most appealing intuitions
underlying the two alternative, content and the likeness, approaches. As
we shall see in a moment, Popper’s original account, even if flawed, falls
squarely among the consequence-based accounts (Schurz and Weingartner
2010; Oddie 2013). Another example is Schurz’s own “relevant element” ac-
count of truthlikeness, which represents a refined improvement of Popper’s
definition, avoids its defects, and will be discussed in section 4.
In this connection, Schurz has proposed a further interesting distinction,
that between conjunctive and disjunctive approaches to theory representa-
tion (Schurz and Weingartner 2010; Schurz 2011). The key idea is that the
way in which propositions, or theories, are represented in the first place can
have significant implications on how their relative verisimilitude is defined
and assessed. Within a conjunctive approach, a proposition h is represented
as a conjunction of minimal “content parts”, i.e., of the smallest items of
information provided by h on the world; as an example, h may be the
conjunction of its consequences in some language. A disjunctive approach
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instead represents h as a disjunction of maximal “alternative possibilities”,
like the possible worlds or the models of the underlying language.1 Accord-
ing to Schurz, conjunctive approaches to theory representation are intrinsi-
cally more plausible and cognitively more manageable than disjunctive ones.
Schurz’s own approach, as well as consequence-based accounts in general,
assume a conjunctive view of propositions and theories.
It is worth noting that Schurz’s conjunctive/disjunctive distinction is
somehow orthogonal to the content/likeness distinction already discussed
above. For instance, both Oddie’s and Niiniluoto’s likeness-based account
employ a disjunctive approach to theory representation. However, also
Miller’s and Kuipers’ content approaches are disjunctive in this sense (Miller
1978; Kuipers 2000). On the other hand, Cevolani (2016) has shown how
a conjunctive view can lead to a content-based ordering of truthlikeness.
We shall come back to these issues in the final section 5. In the next sec-
tion, we present a consequence-based account of truthlikeness, based on a
conjunctive representation of propositions, which however turns out to have
surprising relationships with the disjunctive, likeness-based approaches.
3 Truthlikeness as (partial) information about the
truth
Popper’s definition of verisimilitude was based on apparently a sound intu-
ition: the more true consequences and the less false consequences a theory
or hypothesis h has, the greater its verisimilitude. More precisely, let Cn (h)
denote the class of logical consequences of h. Moreover let CnT (h) denote
the class of its true consequences, and CnF (h) the class of its false conse-
quences, to the effect that CnT (h) ∪ CnF (h) = Cn (h). Then, according to
Popper (1963, p. 233), h is at least as close to the truth as g iff h has no
less true consequences (and possibly more) and no more false consequences
(and possibly less) than g:
CnT (h) ⊇ CnT (g) and CnF (h) ⊆ CnF (g)
Moreover, h is closer to the truth than g if at least one of the two above
inclusion relations is strict. It is well-known that Popper’s definition is un-
tenable, due to the so-called Tichy´-Miller theorem. In fact, Miller (1974)
and Tichy´ (1974) independently proved that no false theory h can be closer
to the truth than another (true or false) theory g according to Popper’s
1Of course, this distinction parallels the familiar one between two equivalent ways
of expressing sentences in formal languages, namely, the one between conjunctive and
disjunctive normal forms. As immaterial as this distinction may be from a purely logical
point of view, it can have significant implications for the formal analysis of epistemological
concepts, as already Carnap (1950, secs. 72–73, especially p. 407) observed.
6
definition; i.e., that both P1 and P2 are violated. This proved fatal for Pop-
per’s explication of verisimilitude, showing it worthless for the very purpose
Popper devised it: ordering false theories according to their closeness to the
truth.
All accounts proposed within the post-Popperian research program on
truthlikeness remedy the above defect with Popper’s original definition.
Some of them also retain the fundamental Popperian intuition: that the
truthlikeness of h balance the amount of true information and of false infor-
mation entailed by h. One example is our own “basic feature” approach to
truthlikeness, initially presented in Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa (2011) (see
also Cevolani, Festa, and Kuipers 2013). Before presenting it, we introduce
a small amount of terminology and notation.
We shall frame all relevant definitions in terms of a finite propositional
language Ln with n atomic propositions (cf. e.g. Zwart 2001; Niiniluoto 2003;
Schurz and Weingartner 2010). Within Ln, one can express 22n logically
non-equivalent propositions, including the tautological and the contradictory
ones, denoted > and ⊥ respectively. Given two propositions h and g, h is
said to be logically stronger than g when h entails g but g doesn’t entail h
(in symbols: h  g but g 2 h); thus, ⊥ is the logically strongest proposition,
and > the weakest one.
Among the contingent (i.e., neither tautological nor contradictory), or
factual, propositions of Ln, some play a special role and deserve special
mention. A basic proposition is an atomic proposition or its negation (a
so called literal). A consistent conjunction h of m basic propositions (0 ≤
m ≤ n) will be called a conjunctive proposition of Ln. If m = 0, then h
is tautological; if m = 1, it is a basic statement; and if m = n, it is a so
called constituent (or state description) of Ln. There are 2n constituents,
which are the logically strongest factual propositions of Ln. The set R(h)
of constituents entailing h (or, equivalently, the class of possible worlds in
which h is true) is called the range of h.
By definition, each constituent is logically incompatible with any other,
and only one of them is true; this is denoted t and is the strongest true
statement expressible in Ln. Intuitively, a constituent completely describes
a possible state of affairs of the relevant domain (a “possible world”); thus,
t can be construed as “the (whole) truth” in Ln, i.e., as the complete true
description of the actual world. When one of the constituents of Ln is
identified with the truth t, it partitions the set of propositions of Ln into
the class T = Cn (t) of the true ones and its complement F containing the
false ones. Among these, the “complete falsehood” is represented by the
“worst” constituent f of Ln, which is the conjunction of the negations of all
true basic propositions, i.e., of all the conjuncts of t.
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3.1 The basic feature approach to truthlikeness
Within the basic feature approach, the truthlikeness of h only depends on
what h says about the basic features of the world. These are independent
facts which may or not obtain in the world (like “it’s hot” and “it’s dry”)
and are described by the basic propositions of Ln. Accordingly, the key
Popperian intuition above can be rephrased as follows: h is close to the
truth when h provides much information about the basic features of the
world and most of this information is true.
More formally, let B(h) denote the set of “basic consequences” of h, i.e.,
the set of basic propositions (literals) entailed by h. Following Popper, we
define the set BT (h) = B(h) ∩ Cn (t) of the true basic consequences of h,
and the set BF (h) = B(h)∩F its false basic consequences, to the effect that
BT (h) ∪ BF (h) = B(h). Then, h is at least as truthlike as g iff:
BT (h) ⊇ BT (g) and BF (h) ⊆ BF (g)
Moreover, h is closer to the truth than g if at least one of the two above
inclusion relations is strict. It is not difficult to check that this defini-
tion eschews the problem plaguing Popper’s one, and satisfies all condi-
tions P1–P4. However, it leaves most of the propositions of Ln incompara-
ble in truthlikeness. Suppose for instance that h is “rainy and windy”,
g is “cold”, and the weather is actually cold, rainy and windy. Then
BT (h) = {“rainy”,“windy”}, while BT (g) = {“cold”}. Given that BT (h)
and BT (g) are set-theoretically incomparable, one cannot apply the above
definition to assess the relative truthlikeness of h and g.
To avoid this, one can introduce a simple measure of truthlikeness as
follows. Let contT (h) = |BT (h)|/n and contF (h) = |BF (h)|/n denote, re-
spectively, the normalized number of true and false basic propositions en-
tailed by h. Then a “contrast measure” of truthlikeness is defined as follows
(Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa 2011, p. 188):2
vsb(h) = contT (h)− contF (h)
In words, the verisimilitude of h is the difference between the amount of true
and false information provided by h about the basic features of the world.
As one can show, measure vsb provides adequate assessments of the rela-
tive truthlikeness of the conjunctive propositions of Ln, i.e., of conjunctions
of basic propositions. For instance, in the example just considered above,
“rainy and windy” (h) correctly turns out to be more verisimilar than “cold”
2In that paper, we introduced measure measure vsb in the more general form vsb(h) =
contT (h) − φcontF (h), where φ > 0 expresses the relative weight of truth and falsity
in assessing truthlikeness. Here, we shall only consider the special case φ = 1. The
label “contrast measure” refers to Amos Tversky’s “feature contrast” model of similarity
between psychological stimuli.
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(g), since h entails two true basic propositions instead of only one, as g does.
However, measure vsb is inadequate for non-conjunctive propositions, as the
following example shows.
Let Henry accept the disjunctive proposition h that it will be cold or
rainy, whereas Gloria believes g, that it will be hot or dry or still. If the truth
t is that the weather is actually cold, rainy and windy, then, intuitively, h is
closer to the truth than g. This is so not only because h is true and g is false;
but also because g is actually equivalent to ¬t, i.e., admits all possibilities
except the truth itself. Still, it is easy to check that BT (h) = BT (g) = ∅ and
BF (h) = BF (g) = ∅, and hence h and g are equally verisimilar, i.e., have
the same degree of truthlikeness as a tautology. More generally, all “weak”
propositions (like all disjunctive or conditional propositions) are assigned
the same (null) degree of truthlikeness. The new truthlikeness measure
presented in the following overcomes this limitation of our previous account
while preserving the central ideas underlying it.
3.2 From “categorical” to “partial” information
The unsatisfactory result above is due to the naive definition of “informa-
tion” we are employing. According to such definition, h provides information
about the world just in case h logically entails some basic proposition of Ln;
otherwise, h doesn’t provide any information at all. This is, however, too
restrictive: intuitively, it is clear that, for instance, “cold or rainy” does
provide at least some information about the weather, although not so much
information as that provided by “cold” (or “rainy”) itself. In short, our
“categorical” account of information is too crude to deliver a fine grained
definition of verisimilitude.
A better account is however in sight. To this purpose, we mobilize some
classical work concerning confirmation and partial entailment (cf. Carnap
1950 and Salmon 1969; see also Crupi and Tentori 2013 and Roche 2018,
sec. 5). A proposition h (“fully”) entails another proposition g when g is
true in all cases h is, or, equivalently, when R(h) ⊆ R(g), i.e., when the
range of h is included in that of g. Instead, h “partially” entails g when
g is true in most (but not necessarily all) the cases h is. More precisely, h
partially entails g when h is “positively relevant” for g, i.e., when h raises
the proportion of cases in which g is true (Salmon 1969, p. 63).
Let m be the “logical” probability measure, i.e., the measure assigning
the same degree of probability to all constituents of Ln. Since there are 2n
constituents, each of them has probability 1/2n. Moreover, the probability
of h is simply the proportion of constituents entailing h out of the total
number of constituents: m(h) = |R(h)|/2n. It follows that if b is a basic
proposition, m(b) = 2n−1/2n = 1/2. Assuming that h is consistent (as we
shall always assume in the following), the conditional logical probability of
g given h is defined as usual, i.e., m(g|h) = m(h ∧ g)/m(h). This means
9
that m(g|h) is the proportion of the cases (i.e., constituents) in which g is
true out of the total number of cases in which h is true. Then, according
to the “positive relevance” account of partial entailment, h partially entails
g iff m(g|h) > m(g). Note that, if h (fully) entails g, then h also partially
entails g, since m(g|h) takes its maximum value 1, but not vice versa.
The notion of partial entailment provides us with a corresponding ac-
count of “partial” (vs. categorical) information. We shall say that h provides
partial information about g just in case h partially entails g. As far as ba-
sic propositions b are concerned, this happens just in case m(b|h) > 1/2.
Accordingly, we call any b such that m(b|h) > 1/2 a “partial basic conse-
quence” of h and denote PB (h) their class. Of course, any basic consequence
of h—i.e., any basic proposition “fully” entailed by h—is also a partial basic
consequence of h, but not vice versa. How much information does h provide
about its partial basic consequences? A natural measure would be the plain
difference m(b|h) − m(b) = m(b|h) − 12 , which however varies between −12
and 12 . It is then sufficient to multiply this quantity by 2 in order to obtain
the following normalized measure of the information provided by h on b:
inf (h, b) = 2×
(
m(b|h)− 1
2
)
Note that inf (h, b) varies between −1 (if h  ¬b) and 1 (if h  b, i.e., if b is
a plain basic consequence of h).
Now, using again Popper’s definition as a benchmark, let us denote
PBT (h) = PB (h) ∩ T and PBF (h) = PB (h) ∩ F , respectively, the class
of true and false partial basic consequences of h, i.e., the set of basic truths
and of basic falsehoods partially entailed by h. Moreover, define inf T (h)
and inf F (h), respectively, as follows:
inf T (h) =
1
n
×
∑
b∈PBT (h)
inf (h, b) and inf F (h) =
1
n
×
∑
b∈PBF (h)
inf (h, b)
i.e., as the normalized amount of information provided about the basic truths
(resp. falsehoods) partially entailed by h.
Finally, the truthlikeness of h is defined as the difference between the
amounts of partial true and false information provided by h about the basic
features of the world:
vs (h) = inf T (h)− inf F (h)
The above measure is normalized between 1, the degree of truthlikeness of
the truth t, and −1, the truthlikeness of the “complete falsehood” f , i.e.,
the conjunction of the negations of the literals of t. The verisimilitude of a
tautology, which is 0, provides a sort of natural middle point, discriminating
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between those propositions h for which the amount of partial true informa-
tion exceeds the amount of partial false information, and hence vs (h) > 0,
and those for which the opposite is true, and hence vs (h) < 0.3
Moreover, measure vs has a number of interesting features, to which we
now turn. To illustrate them, let us come back to our weather example. Let
c (“cold”), r (“rainy”), and w (“windy”) be the only primitive propositions
of a simple meteorological language L3. Moreover, assume that the truth t
about the weather (in some location, at some time) is c ∧ r ∧ w.
First, note that measure vs provides assessments of relative truthlikeness
also for pairs of propositions that measure vsb cannot discriminate. Take
for instance the two propositions c∨ r (“cold or rainy”) and ≡ ¬c∨¬r∨¬w
(“hot or dry or still”) already considered above. Then one can check that
vsb(c ∨ r) = vsb(¬c ∨ ¬r ∨ ¬w) = 0 = vsb(>). However, vs (c ∨ r) ' 0.22 >
−0.14 ' vs (¬c ∨ ¬r ∨ ¬w), which is the intuitively right assessment.
Second, while “extending” measure vsb in the above sense, measure vs
agrees with it as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned. This is
because, if h is a conjunction of literals, the amount of true and false partial
information provided by h reduces, respectively, to the plain (normalized)
number of true and false basic propositions entailed by h; and hence vs (h)
reduces to vsb(h). To illustrate, consider two conjunctive propositions like
h ≡ ¬c ∧ r ∧ w and g ≡ ¬c ∧ ¬r ∧ w. Then it is clear that, on the one
hand, inf T (h) = contT (h) =
2
3 and inf F (h) = contF (h) =
1
3 ; and that,
on the other hand, inf T (g) = contT (g) =
1
3 and inf F (g) = contF (g) =
2
3 .
Accordingly, vs (h) = vsb(h) =
1
3 > −13 = vsb(g) = vs (g).
Third, measure vs meets most of the adequacy conditions discussed in
the literature. The example just discussed shows that vs satisfies condition
P1, i.e., is able to order falsehoods according to their relative verisimilitude,
thus eschewing the issue trivializing Popper’s definition. As for P2, it is easy
to find cases of informative falsehoods which are more verisimilar than some
uninformative truths: for instance, vs (¬c∧ r∧w) ' 0.33 > 0.22 ' vs (c∨ r),
even if the former proposition is false and the latter is true. Finally, stronger
falsehoods may well be less verisimilar than weaker ones, thus respecting P4:
for instance, it is easy to check that vs (¬c) = −13 > −23 = vs (¬r ∧ ¬w).
Fourth, measure vs fails to meet the Popperian condition P3, according
to which truthlikeness increases with content among truths. As an example
of this violation, consider the following: vs (c ∨ ¬r) = 0 < 0.05 ' vs (c ∨
¬r ∨ w), even if the former (true) proposition entails the latter, and hence
is more informative. This is a surprising result, since measure vs was, so
3Note that here we could consider, as we did in the original account (Cevolani, Crupi,
and Festa 2011, p. 188), a more general form of measure vs—i.e., inf T (h) − φinf F (h)—
where parameter φ > 0 weighs the total amount of false information provided by h. In
light of Theorem 1 from the next section, this would invite for a comparison between this
weighted measure and Oddie’s weighted average measure of truthlikeness (Oddie 2013,
p. 1663). We leave this issue to another occasion.
11
to speak, built on the top of measure vsb, which satisfies P3 and encodes
the key Popperian intuition that truthlikeness is a mixture of truth and
content (cf. Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa 2011, pp. 187–8). Moreover, and
interestingly, the above result has to be qualified. In fact, it is easy to check
that vs meets P3 as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned: more
precisely, it satisfies the following condition, which follows from P3 but it is
strictly weaker than it:
P5 If h and g are true conjunctive propositions, and h entails g, h is closer
to the truth than g.
As an example, vs (c ∧ r) = 23 > 13 = vs (c). In short, adding true conjuncts
to true conjunctions of basic propositions does increase truthlikeness. Still,
in the general case the proposed account violates P3; as we shall see in the
next section, there are deep and interesting reasons for why this is the case.
4 Discussion and comparison with other accounts
In the foregoing section, we introduced a new truthlikeness measure for
propositional languages grounded in and extending our original basic fea-
ture approach to verisimilitude (Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa 2011; Cevolani,
Festa, and Kuipers 2013). Such measure (vs ) is an improvement on the orig-
inal measure (vsb) insofar as it allows to compare any pair of propositions,
instead of conjunctive propositions only, in terms of their relative truthlike-
ness. The new account retains the central Popperian intuition according to
which the truthlikeness of h increases the more true information, and the
less false information, h delivers about the truth. In particular, truthlikeness
depends on the degree to which h partially entails basic truths and basic
falsehoods about the relevant domain.
With reference to the classification proposed by Schurz and Weingartner
(2010), the proposed account seems clearly consequence-based and employs
a conjunctive approach to theory representation, since propositions are iden-
tified with the sets of their partial basic consequences. For this reason, it
is surprising that it violates condition P3: that logically stronger truths are
more informative, and hence more truthlike, than logically weaker truths.
This principle, which Oddie (2013) calls “the value of content for truths”,
was defended by Popper (1963) and is typically satisfied by content-based
and consequence-based accounts, like that of Schurz and Weingartner (1987,
2010). As for the similarity based approaches, it is defended by Niiniluoto
(1987) and rejected by Oddie (1986, 2013). As we shall see in a moment,
the fact that our account here agrees with Oddie’s one is no coincidence at
all.
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4.1 A surprising equivalence
To understand the relations between our approach and other ones in the
literature, let us first see how Oddie’s account work. The starting point
of the similarity approach is defining a measure λ(w, t) of the likeness or
closeness of an arbitrary constituent to the true constituent t (Oddie 2013,
sect. 5). In our propositional framework, one can simply define λ(w, t) as
the number of atomic propositions on which w and t agree, divided by n.
In this way, one immediately obtains that λ(w, t) = 1 iff w is the truth
itself, and that the complete falsehood f is maximally distant from t, since
λ(t, f) = 0. The similarity approach assumes, in Schurz’s terminology, a
disjunctive view of propositions, representing h as the set of possible worlds
compatible with h or, equivalently, as the disjunction of the constituents in
its range R(h). By considering the average closeness to the actual world of
all worlds in R(h), one obtains the so called Tichy´-Oddie “average” measure
of truthlikeness (Oddie 1986):
vsav(h)
df
=
∑
wh λ(w, t)
|R(h)|
where |R(h)| is the number of constituents entailing h. This measure varies
between vsav(t) = 1 and vsav(f) = 0; a tautology has an intermediate degree
of truthlikeness vsav(>) = 12 . It is well known that the average account
meets P1, P2, and P4, but violates P3, the value of content for truths: for
instance, with reference again to our weather example, where t is c ∧ r ∧w,
one can check that vsav(c∨¬r) = 0.5 < 0.57 ' vsav(c∨¬r∨w), even if both
propositions are true and the former is logically stronger than the latter.
Interestingly, however, also the average measure, like vs , meets the value of
content for truths as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned, i.e. P5,
as it is easy to check.
These similarities between our proposed measure vs and Oddie’s measure
vsav are explained by the following result:
Theorem 1 Measures vs and vsav are ordinally equivalent.
This means that, for any pair of propositions h and g, vs (h) > vs (g) iff
vsav(h) > vsav(g). Indeed, we can even prove that vs is a simple linear
transformation of vsav, so that they are essentially the same measure: for
any h
vs (h) = 2× vsav(h)− 1
The above result is surprising since the two accounts were originally based on
radically different intuitions about truthlikeness. On the one hand, it con-
firms the idea, defended by Schurz and Weingartner (2010, pp. 422–3), that
conjunctive, consequence-based accounts like the one proposed here are suc-
cessful in accommodating both “content” and “likeness” intuitions—to the
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point, in fact, to recover the full account proposed by Oddie within the sim-
ilarity approach. On the other hand, Theorem 1 shows that a consequence-
based account can violate one central Popperian condition, i.e., P3, contrary
to what Schurz and Weingartner (2010, p. 422) would like to assume.
In this connection, it is interesting to see how our account relates to
the one proposed by Schurz and Weingartner (1987, 2010). Their idea is to
retain Popper’s consequence-based definition of truthlikeness while restrict-
ing the class of consequences which are relevant in assessing truthlikeness.
Accordingly, each proposition h is identified with the set of the “relevant ele-
ments” it entails. Then one can again follow Popper and say that h is closer
to the truth than g iff, roughly, h entails more true relevant elements and
less false relevant elements than g (Schurz and Weingartner 1987). Schurz
and Weingartner (2010, sec. 5) improve on their previous, comparative ac-
count by defining a truthlikeness measure vsSW which appropriately weigh
true and false elements and meets all requirements P1–P4. Even without
considering the complete definitions (which are somehow technically intri-
cate), an example will nicely illustrate the above point and give the flavor
of Schurz and Weingartner’s approach.
With reference to the usual weather example, let us consider the two
propositions h = c ∨ ¬r (“cold or dry”) and g = c ∨ ¬r ∨ w (“cold or
dry or windy”). Note that both h and g are true, and that h logically
entails g. According to Schurz and Weingartner (1987, p. 54), the only
relevant elements entailed by h and g are, respectively, h and g themselves:
these are their only weakest consequences besides trivial ones, like > or
irrelevant disjunctive weakenings of the original theories. Now, while both
h and g only entail true relevant elements (i.e., themselves), g is a proper
disjunctive weakening on h and hence should be assigned only a “fraction”
of the truthlikeness degree of h (Schurz and Weingartner 2010, p. 431). In
fact, one can calculate that vsSW (h) =
1
6 >
1
9 = vsSW (g).
4 This assessment
respects P3.
In our approach, things are different. Here, h = c ∨ ¬r provides exactly
the same amount of information about a basic truth (c) and a basic falsehood
(¬r). Accordingly, these two amounts cancel each other out and the total
degree of truthlikeness is vs (h) = 0. As for g = c ∨ ¬r ∨ w, instead, the
new true disjunct does provide some information about a basic truth (w),
if quite small, and this makes the overall truthlikeness increase: in fact, one
can check that vs (h) = 0 < 0.05 ' vs (g). This violates P3 and shows that
our measure is not ordinally equivalent to the one proposed by Schurz and
Weingartner.
4The general formula for calculating the truthlikeness of disjunctions with both true
and false literals is v
k
× (n−k+1)!
n!
), where k is the total number of disjuncts, v is the number
of true disjuncts, and n is the number of atomic propositions of the language (Schurz and
Weingartner 2010, p. 431).
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4.2 Truthlikeness and logical strength
As noted above, the truthlikeness measure proposed here violates the “value
of content for truths” condition (P3), which is instead satisfied by both
content-based (Miller, Kuipers), consequence-based (Popper, Schurz and
Weingartner) and some similarity-based accounts (Niiniluoto). Such result
can be evaluated in two ways. It will be read as a flaw of our account by
those who think that P3 is indispensable as a principle governing truthlike-
ness assessments. If however the general validity of P3 is perceived as an
open problem, our result counts as a new argument in favor of the view that
weakening true theories need not make their truthlikeness decrease in the
general case, but only as far as conjunctive theories are concerned. Without
trying to assess here the debate on this point, we would like to draw the
reader’s attention on further principles that, like P3, P4, and P5, connect
logical strength with truthlikeness by constraining the relative verisimilitude
of pairs of propositions, one of which entails the other.
First, one may note that, among the fundamental principles P1–P4,
P3 has a special status, being the strongest, i.e., the most restrictive one.
This is clear if one compares P4 and P3: the former just requires that,
among false propositions, truthlikeness doesn’t not always covary with logical
strength (leaving the possibility open that this happens for particular pairs
of false propositions), while the latter demands that this must happen for
true propositions. A weaker principle, comparable to P4, would be the
following:
P6 If h and g are true, and h entails g, h may be closer to the truth than g.
Such principle is arguably an indispensable adequacy condition, and is in-
deed satisfied by all accounts on the market, including the one presented
here.
Other ways of weakening P3 have to do with the logical form of the
relevant propositions involved in the comparison. For instance, let us call
“completely true” a disjunction of only true literals, like for instance c, c∨w,
c∨ r∨w in our weather example (note that, as for conjunctive propositions,
we consider a single literal as a “degenerate” disjunction). Then one can
consider the following condition:
P7 If h and g are completely true disjunctions, and h entails g, h is closer
to the truth than g.
Since P3 entails P7 (but not vice versa), all accounts meeting P3 also satisfies
P7. Interestingly, however, also our proposed measure vs , which fails to
meet P3, satisfies P7 (as does the average measure, by Theorem 1). Thus,
while truthlikeness does not covary in general with logical strength among
true propositions, this is the case as far as completely true disjunctions are
concerned.
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Let us now call a conjunctive proposition “completely false” just in case
its conjuncts (literals) are all false (an example is f , the complete falsehood
of the language).5 So for instance, in the weather example, ¬c and ¬c ∧ ¬r
are completely false in this sense. Now the following requirement seems
quite natural:
P8 If h and g are completely false conjunctive propositions, and g entails h,
h is closer to the truth than g.
The above condition requires that truthlikeness increases with logical weak-
ness among complete conjunctive falsehoods. Intuitively, this seems hardly
disputable: in the above example, moving from ¬c ∧ ¬r to ¬c alone seems
clearly an improvement in terms of truthlikeness. Indeed, this is what all
accounts on the market deliver, with the exception of the content-based
accounts, which violates P4 and hence also P8.
Finally, Ilkka Niiniluoto (personal communication) has attracted our at-
tention on another condition which is rarely discussed in the literature (but
see Schurz and Weingartner 1987, p. 65, for an exception). This corresponds
to principle P8 above, but concerns false disjunctions of literals, i.e., disjunc-
tions of false basic propositions only, like ¬c and ¬c ∨ ¬w in our example.
Now the principle corresponding to P8 above becomes:
P9 If h and g are false disjunctions of basic propositions, and g entails h, h
is closer to the truth than g.
For instance, P9 requires that moving from ¬c to ¬c ∨ ¬w does improve
truthlikeness. Is this principle defensible in general? Intuitions are less
clear here than in the case of conjunctive propositions. Within the account
proposed in this paper, a positive answer to the above question can be
given along the following lines: both ¬c and ¬c ∨ ¬w only provide false
information about the world; however, the weaker theory provides a smaller
amount of such false information, and hence it is more verisimilar. In fact,
one can check that our account does meet condition P9. A similar diagnosis
is given by Schurz and Weingartner (1987, 65, notation adapted): “if g is
stronger than h, both h and g are false and have no nontrivial true relevant
consequences, then g states a stronger relevant falsity than h and has not
more relevant truth content, hence g should be considered more distant from
the truth than h.”
Niiniluoto, however, disagrees (personal communication). From his similarity-
based perspective, moving from ¬c to ¬c ∨ ¬w does not improve our “best
guess” about the truth (since the possible world w closest to t is at distance
5One may note that conjunction and disjunctions are “dual” to each other in the sense
that a true conjunction is also “completely true” (but a false conjunction doesn’t need
to be completely false) whereas a false disjunction is also “completely false” (but a true
disjunction doesn’t need to be completely true).
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λ(w, t) = 13 in both cases) and it decreases the amount of information pro-
vided by the latter theory. Accordingly, ¬c should be at least as close to the
truth as ¬c∨¬w and P9 should be rejected, which is what Niiniluoto’s “min-
sum” measure of truthlikeness delivers. As convincing as one may find such
argument, one should note that it follows from our Theorem 1 that also
Oddie’s similarity-based account meets P9. This suggests that similarity
considerations alone are not enough to settle the question here.
In the end, we feel that further discussion is needed to properly assess the
debate on the relations between truthlikeness and logical strength. Princi-
ples P3–9 surveyed here provide a reasonably complete and hopefully useful
selection of conditions which might orientate such discussion in the future.
5 Conclusions and further work
In this paper, we proposed a new account of truthlikeness for propositional
theories. In a nutshell, the truthlikeness of h depends on the amount of
true and false information provided by h on the basic features of the world.
The resulting measure improves on the one proposed in the original basic
feature approach in being applicable to arbitrary, non-conjunctive proposi-
tions. Moreover it meets some important adequacy conditions discussed in
the literature; in particular, it eschews both the trivialization result plaguing
Popper’s original definition and the child’s play objection troubling content-
based accounts of truthlikeness.
The proposed account agrees with Popper, Schurz and Weingartner, and
other proponents of consequence-based approaches on explicating truthlike-
ness in terms of true and false pieces of information entailed by different
theories. Still, and surprisingly, it turns out to be equivalent to Oddie’s well-
known similarity-based account. As a consequence, it violates the “value of
content for truths” condition (P3), which is instead satisfied by both content-
based (Miller, Kuipers), consequence-based (Popper, Schurz and Weingart-
ner) and some similarity-based accounts (Niiniluoto). On the other hand,
it meets other, plausible conditions (surveyed in the previous section) con-
cerning the interplay between truthlikeness and logical strength.
As noted by two anonymous reviewers, these features of our account
raise interesting questions about how it should be accommodated within the
classification of different approaches to truthlikeness introduced in section 2,
and whether such classification is still tenable in the light of our results.
Recall that, following Schurz, we started by considering two different ways
of classifying existing accounts of truthlikeness: one based on a threefold
classification among consequence, content, and likeness approaches, and one
based on a twofold distinction between conjunctive and disjunctive views of
theories. The latter distinction simply concerns how theories or propositions
are represented, i.e., as conjunctions of content-parts or as disjunctions of
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conjunctive disjunctive
consequence Schurz and Weingartner
(1987, 2010)
?
content Cevolani (2016)
Kuipers (1987, 2000),
Miller (1978)
likeness ?
Niiniluoto (1987),
Oddie (1986)
Table 1: Combining the three approaches to truthlikeness (rows) and the
two approaches to theory representation (columns).
possibilities. The former classification is somehow vaguer, and has to do
both with the method of constructing verisimilitude measures and with the
basic principles such measures satisfy. In a nutshell, consequence approaches
usually respect both principles P3 and P4; content approaches meet P3 and
the negation of P4; and likeness approaches satisfy at least P4 and possibly
(but not necessarily) P3.
Combined together, Schurz’s distinctions would give raise to six possi-
ble combinations, corresponding to the six types of accounts displayed in
table 1 along with some representative instances of them to be found in the
literature. How should we classify our present account within the table? It
is clear that we assumed a conjunctive representation of theories, so it must
belong to the left column. Moreover, we defined truthlikeness in terms of
true and false partial consequences, so our measure vs is clearly an instance
of consequence-based approaches, thus belonging to the top-left cell.6 On
the other hand, in view of Theorem 1, measure vs seems also to belong to
the class of conjunctive and likeness-based accounts in the bottom-left cell,
which, as far as we know, was previously not instantiated in the literature.
In fact, it violates principle P3, as only likeness-based accounts do (Oddie
2013), and it is equivalent to Oddie’s measure, which is, by all standards, a
canonical example of a likeness-based definition of truthlikeness.
The fact that the present account may appear both under the “conse-
quence” and under the “likeness” heading in table 1 suggests that the three
elements in the consequence/content/likeness classification are at best ex-
haustive but not exclusive. Moreover, the top-right cell in the table seems
to remain empty. This would contain consequence-based accounts (defining
truthlikeness as a matter of true and false consequences of theories) which
employ a disjunctive representation of theories in terms of possible worlds
(or constituents). To the best of our knowledge, no such account has been
6In addition, also the measures discussed in Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa (2011) and
Cevolani, Festa, and Kuipers (2013), on which measure vs is based, clearly belong to
the conjunctive, consequence-based category, even if they are only defined for so-called
conjunctive theories (cf. section 3).
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proposed in the literature; also, it doesn’t seem easy to imagine how it
would work. This suggests, in turn, that the consequence/content/likeness
and the conjunctive/disjunctive distinctions are not independent from each
other (since it seems that consequence approaches can only be conjunctive
as far as theory representation is concerned). How to evaluate this situa-
tion is still matter of debate. On the one hand, one may believe, as one
of the reviewers does, that Schurz’s distinctions, illustrated in table 1, are
ill-founded and could be dispensed of. On the other hand, one can defend
the resulting classification as an heuristically useful tool for better under-
standing the assumptions of different accounts and their relationships, as
we did in this paper. Also in view of recent, ongoing work to make such
classification mathematically more precise (cf. Oddie 2013), we hope that
our present results will contribute to the future discussion on these issues.
Another, related debate has to do with the preferability of conjunctive
over disjunctive accounts (or vice versa). Schurz and Weingartner (2010,
pp. 423-4) claim that the former are more plausible than the latter, es-
sentially because they are cognitively more natural and manageable. One
reviewer asks how this can be true in general, in view of the fact (stated in
Theorem 1) that our conjunctive account is equivalent to Oddie’s disjunctive
account. This is an interesting issue, which we cannot discuss here in full
details. Two remarks, however, are in order.
First, the fact that two methods of measuring or calculating some quan-
tity are equivalent in the sense of giving the same results (as measure vs and
Oddie’s measure are) does not imply that they are “cognitively equivalent”
in the sense of being equally transparent or their steps being equally acces-
sible from a cognitive point of view. A familiar example comes from the
so-called divisibility rules of arithmetic: for example, to check, say, whether
a given (big) integer is divisible by 9, one can either perform the required
division or sum the digits of the number and verify whether the result is di-
visible by 9. The two methods are equivalent, but the latter is much simpler
and more easily applied. Second, the advantages of a conjunctive account
of truthlikeness over a disjunctive one may become clear not so much when
defining truthlikeness measures (what we did in this paper), but rather,
when one employs these measures in order to assess the relative expected
truthlikeness of two competing hypotheses on the basis of some given ev-
idence. As far as our present account is concerned, we conjecture that it
delivers an especially simple measure of expected truthlikeness, which can
then be usefully applied to solve the so called epistemic problem of verisimil-
itude. The discussion of this conjecture, however, has to be left for another
occasion.
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A Proofs
In the following, we prove all the main claims in the paper.
• Measure vs meets P5. Let be h and g true, conjunctive propositions,
i.e., conjunctions of true literals. It is then clear that inf F (h) =
inf F (g) = 0, since both h and g partially entail no basic falsehoods.
Moreover, inf T (h) = |BT (h)|/n and inf T (g) = |BT (g)|/n, since both
h and g “fully” entail each of their own conjuncts. Suppose now that
h entails g. This means that BT (h) ⊃ BT (g), i.e., that h adds to
g some true conjunct, and hence inf T (h) > inf T (g). It follows that
vs (h) = inf T (h) > inf T (g) = vs (g), i.e., that P5 is satisfied.
• Measure vsav meets P5. If h is a conjunctive proposition, all con-
stituents in the range of h are “completions” of h, in the sense that
they all agree with h on each of its conjuncts. Now suppose that h and
g are true, conjunctive propositions such that h is logically stronger
21
than g. This means that h entails all (true) conjuncts of g and also
some other true conjunct. In turn, this means that, by the closeness
measure λ, each constituent in the range of h is closer to the truth than
each constituent in that of g. It follows that the average truthlikeness
is greater for h than for g, i.e., that P5 is satisfied.
• Theorem 1: Measures vs and vsav are ordinally equivalent. In the fol-
lowing, we shall use b to denote arbitrary an basic proposition (literal)
of Ln, w to denote an arbitrary constituent, and t for the true con-
stituent. Moreover, in order to simplify notation, we shall write r(h)
for |R(h)|, i.e., for the number of constituents entailing h.
We start by noting that, for any h and b, m(¬b|h) = 1−m(b|h); from
this and the definition of inf it follows that inf (h,¬b) = −inf (h, b).
Accordingly, vs can be rewritten as follows:
vs (h) = inf T (h)− inf F (h)
= 1n ×
∑
b∈PBT (h) inf (h, b)− 1n ×
∑
b∈PBF (h) inf (h, b)
= 1n ×
∑
b∈PB (h):tb inf (h, b)− 1n ×
∑
b∈PB (h):t¬b inf (h, b)
= 1n ×
∑
b∈PB (h):tb inf (h, b)− 1n ×
∑
b 6∈PB (h):tb−inf (h, b)
= 1n ×
∑
b∈PB (h):tb inf (h, b) +
1
n ×
∑
b 6∈PB (h):tb inf (h, b)
= 1n ×
∑
b:tb inf (h, b)
Moreover, by definition of inf :
vs (h) = 1n ×
∑
b:tb inf (h, b)
= 1n ×
∑
b:tb
(
2(m(b|h)− 12)
)
= 2n ×
∑
b:tb
(
m(b|h)− 12
)
= 2n
(∑
b:tb m(b|h)− n2
)
= 2n
∑
b:tb m(b|h)− 1
(1)
As for the average measure, note that, by definition of vsavh, of λ(w, t),
and of BT (w):
vsav(h) =
1
r(h)
∑
w:wh λ(w, t)
= 1r(h)
∑
w:wh
|BT (w)|
n
Moreover, since for any constituent w, r(b∧w) is either 1 (if w  b) or
0 (if w 2 b), |BT (w)| can be written as
∑
b:tb r(b ∧ w). Accordingly,
vsav(h) =
1
r(h)
∑
w:wh
1
n
∑
b:tb r(b ∧ w)
= 1n
∑
w:wh
∑
b:tb
r(b∧w)
r(h)
Now note that m(b|h) = m(b∧h)m(h) = r(b∧h)r(h) by definition. In turn,
r(b ∧ h) can be written as ∑w:wh r(b ∧ w). It follows that m(b|h) =∑
w:wh
r(b∧w)
r(h) and hence that:
vsav(h) =
1
n
∑
b:tb m(b|h) (2)
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By the comparison of equations 1 and 2 above, it follows that:
vs (h) = 2× vsav(h)− 1
and hence that measures vs and vsav are ordinally equivalent, which
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
• Measure vs meets P7. We start by stating the following results, which
will be useful in the following. First, if h is a disjunction of k literals,
the amount of information provided by h on each of its disjunct b is:
inf (h, b) = 2× (m(b|h)− 12) = 2× (m(b∧h)m(h) − 12)
= 2×
(
2n−1
2n−2n−k − 12
)
= 1
2k−1
(3)
In fact, note that if b is a disjunct of h, then b  h and m(b ∧ h) =
m(b) = 2n−1. Moreover, h is false only in those worlds where all
k literals of h are false; since there are 2n−k such worlds, m(h) =
2n − 2n−k.
Second, if h is either completely true or false, its truthlikeness only
depends on the total number k of its disjunct and on the amount of
information provided by h on each of them (as just calculated above).
In fact:
if h is completely true, then vs (h) = inf T (h) =
1
n × k2k−1
if h is false, then vs (h) = −inf F (h) = − 1n × k2k−1
(4)
This is because if h is completely true (resp. false), then it entails no
basic falsehoods (resp. truths), and hence inf F (h) (resp. inf T (h)) is
zero.
Finally, one should note that the factor k
2k−1 appearing in the two
expressions in 4 decreases for increasing k. To show this, we prove
that increasing k by 1 (i.e., weakening h by the addition of one false
disjunct) makes the above factor decrease:
k+1
2k+1−1 <
k
2k−1 iff
(k + 1)
(
2k − 1) < k (2k+1 − 1) iff
2k − 1 < k2k iff
1− 1
2k
< k
(5)
Recalling that k is a positive integer (k ≥ 1), the above inequality is
always satisfied, which proves that k
2k−1 decreases for increasing k.
Now, coming back to P7, let be h and g two completely true disjunc-
tions of literals such that h  g. This means that g weakens h by
adding to it some true basic disjunct, in the sense that g has the form
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h ∨ b for at least one b different from the disjuncts of h. Since the
number k of disjuncts increases by moving from h to g, truthlikeness
decreases by equations 4 and 5 above, and then h is more verisimilar
than g, which proves that vs meets P7.
• Measure vs meets P8. Let be h and g completely false conjunctive
propositions, i.e., conjunctions of false literals. It is then clear that
inf T (h) = inf T (g) = 0, since both h and g partially entail no basic
truths. Moreover, inf F (h) = |BF (h)|/n and inf F (g) = |BF (g)|/n,
since both h and g “fully” entail each of their own conjuncts. Suppose
now that h entails g. This means that BF (h) ⊃ BF (g), i.e., that h
adds to g some false conjunct, and hence that inf F (h) > inf F (g). It
follows in turn that vs (h) = −inf F (h) < −inf F (g) = vs (g), i.e., that
P8 is satisfied.
• Measure vs meets P9. Let be h and g two false disjunctions of literals
such that h  g. This means that g has a greater number of disjuncts
than h (compare the proof that vs meets P7 above). From equations 4
and 5 above, it then follows that inf F (g) < inf F (h) and hence that
vs (g) = −inf F (g) > −inf F (h) = vs (h), i.e., that g is more verisimilar
than h, which proves that vs meets P9.
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